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Abstract: This paper takes issue with the widespread claim that positional competitions are 
zero-sum games. It shows how the notions of ‘positional good’ and ‘positional competition’ 
have changed in meaning and how this has resulted in conceptual confusion in discussions 
amongst economists and philosophers. I argue that the Zero-Sum Claim is hardly ever true 
when it comes to the novel understanding of positionality that currently dominates the 
philosophical literature. I propose dropping the Zero-Sum Claim and construing positional 
competitions as win-lose. This is conceptually clearer and deepens our understanding and 
ethical evaluation of these important competitions in contemporary societies. 
 




A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small, it 
satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace rises besides the little house, 
the little house shrinks into a hut. … [T]he occupant of the relatively small house will 
feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its four walls. 
(Marx 1849 [2010]: 216)  
 
 
Competitions for money, power and status form a substantial part of life. Applicants compete 
for jobs, employees for promotions, politicians for (the largest number of) votes and many of 
us compete for status by buying and flaunting status goods (such as ever-larger houses). These 
competitions have been labelled ‘positional competitions’, as they revolve around obtaining 
what has become known as ‘positional goods’. In this paper, I will show how the meaning of 
these notions has evolved over time and has been used in multiple, often incompatible, ways 
in debates amongst both economists and philosophers. In particular, I will focus on the claim 
that positional competitions are zero-sum games (Brighouse and Swift 2006; Fishkin 2014; 
Grolleau et al. 2012; Heath 2018; Hirsch 1976 [1999]; Kolodny 2010; Pagano 1999; Wilkinson 
and Pickett 2018). 
 The problem is that different theorists in the literature use the same terms—‘positional 
competition’ and ‘positional goods’ being ‘zero-sum’—but do not talk about the same 
phenomena. This leads to confusions and misunderstandings that have remained unrecognised 
up until now. ‘Positional competition’, as coined by economist Fred Hirsch in 1976, took on a 
life of its own, which has led to different understandings of the same term. As I will show, the 
predominantly used in the philosophical literature has diverged so much from the one used by 
economists that those adhering to the philosophical understanding cannot meaningfully speak 
of positional competitions as zero-sum games anymore. In this paper, I argue that those who 
want to use the philosophical understanding of actual positional competitions that people face 
on a daily basis need to drop the idea that positional competitions are ‘zero-sum’. This notion 
fails to capture what it is that characterises positional competition in its philosophical sense: 
that one party can be made better off only by making another party worse off.  
My conceptual solution to this conundrum will be to think of positional competitions 
more broadly as win-lose games. This not only captures what is characteristic of positional 
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competition but also has important implications for the philosophical literature—for example, 
for discussions on the conditions under which positional competitions are desirable or not and 
whether or not levelling down can be justified in the case of positional goods. 
 The aim of this paper, then, is to argue for an alternative understanding of positional 
competition as a win-lose game, which, in turn, will both make the concept of ‘positional 
competition’ more accurate and expand its scope (that is, more phenomena will plausibly be 
represented by this new conception). The advantage of identifying a distinct philosophical 
understanding of positional competition as a win-lose game is that it facilitates a more nuanced 
discussion on the desirability of and fairness in (actual) positional competitions (e.g. in politics, 
the labour market and education). 
First, I will present how different influential authors describe positional goods as zero-
sum goods and positional competitions as zero-sum games. I will classify these authors as 
either having an ‘economic’ or a ‘philosophical’ understanding (section 2). Then, I introduce 
why the Zero-Sum Claim is problematic for the philosophical understanding of positionality 
(section 3). Building on this, I proceed to highlight that the Zero-Sum Claim, understood in 
abstraction, fails to meaningfully say something about actual, real-life cases and fails to capture 
and isolate what is characteristic of positional competitions (section 4). Given these problems, 
I propose making a Win-Lose Claim when speaking of positional competition. This broader 
notion fits with the philosophical understanding of positional competitions, thereby providing 
the needed conceptual clarity in discussions on the desirability of (actual) positional 
competitions in debates on distributive justice (section 5). Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Two Understandings of Positional Goods and Positional Competition 
 
In this section, I spell out some of the key terminology and make a crucial distinction that has 
not yet been made explicitly in the literature so far, but that is needed to get a grip on 
discussions about positional competition. I will explain what positional goods and positional 
competitions are according to what I will call the ‘economic understanding’ (2.1.) and the 
‘philosophical understanding’ (2.2.)1 and point out crucial aspects in which they differ (2.3.). 
Both of these understandings employ what I call the Zero-Sum Claim. 
 
The Zero-Sum Claim. Positional competition is necessarily a zero-sum game.  
 
Strictly speaking, goods are zero-sum if their total amount is fixed (Grolleau et al. 2014: 464). 
A zero-sum game, then, refers to a situation in which the payoffs add up to zero; what one party 
gains is also exactly what the other loses (Kelly 2003: 6, 77). Both the economic and 
philosophical understandings make the Zero-Sum Claim, but, as I will show, only the former 
employs it strictly. 
In what follows, I will go into both understandings of positional competition and show 
why this distinction helps to clear up some of the conceptual confusion that characterises 
discussions on positional competition. 
 
2.1. The Economic Understanding 
 
1 My labels ‘economic’ and ‘philosophical’ understanding are roughly meant to indicate differences between Fred 
Hirsch’s original use of the concepts around positional goods and its later uses in the philosophical literature 
(notably after Brighouse and Swift’s (2006) adapted version of the terms). However, it should be noted that there 
are philosophers who use (elements of) the economic understanding and vice versa. The two labels are merely 
meant to move the debate forward by bringing to light some important substantive differences that have remained 
unrecognised until now. 
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The economist Fred Hirsch famously coined the terms ‘positional good’ and ‘positional 
competition’ in his influential 1976 book Social Limits to Growth. Hirsch’ core distinction was 
between material and positional goods (Hirsch 1976 [1999]: 27–28). According to Hirsch, 
access to material goods is a function of absolute real income and increases as the economy 
grows. In contrast, “[p]ositional goods are defined as those to which access is a function of an 
individual’s income relative to other people. General economic growth does not increase their 
availability” (Matthews 1977: 574). Hirsch calls such goods ‘positional’ because access to 
them is determined by one’s position in the distribution of income. 
According to the economic understanding, positional goods have two interrelated 
aspects: (i) they are fixed-sum and (ii) access to them depends on relative income. Regarding 
(i) fixed-sum goods, their total amount cannot be expanded (Matthews 1977: 574–575). These 
“things in fixed supply” (Frank 1985: 8) are characterised by scarcity, which can be either 
physical or social in nature (Hirsch 1976 [1999]: 19–23).  
Examples of physically scarce goods are paintings by old masters, natural landscapes 
(Hirsch 1976 [1999]: 19–21), diamonds (Frank 1985: 8) and beachfront properties. Many such 
goods are physically scarce because they are a limited natural resource (such as diamonds and 
land). Rembrandt paintings, in turn, are physically scarce because only the original works made 
by the master himself count; there are only so many of them. 
Examples of socially scarce goods are sought-after jobs and leadership positions 
(Hirsch 1976 [1999]: 30, 41–51; Frank 1985: 8). These goods are limited in supply “not by 
physical but by social factors, including the satisfaction engendered by scarcity as such” 
(Hirsch 1976 [1999]: 20). One could divide different leadership tasks over a variety of people 
in a team; there are no physical limitations at play. However, this also takes away the reason 
that makes this one leadership position so desirable—the fact that only one person can occupy 
it and derive satisfaction and social status from it. This scarcity is socially constructed. 
The second aspect revolves around (ii) relative income, which determines one’s access 
to these fixed-sum (oftentimes status) goods. Pursuing them inevitably involves positional 
externalities: if I move up the (relative income) ladder, you necessarily go down (Matthews 
1977: 574–575). Scenic land in the countryside is fixed-sum (the first aspect of positional 
good), and access to this scarce status good (in the form of a holiday cottage) depends on your 
relative position in the income distribution (the second aspect of positional good). A rise in 
income, and thereby a higher position in the relative income distribution for person A, creates 
a positional externality for person B, now going down, relatively speaking. A’s increased access 
to the fixed-sum status good creates an equal loss in access to this good for B. 
Now that we have an idea of what positional goods are according to the economic 
understanding, let us now move to positional competition. Hirsch defines it as follows: 
 
By positional competition is meant competition that is fundamentally for a higher place 
within some explicit or implicit hierarchy and that thereby yields gains for some only 
by dint of losses for others. Positional competition, in the language of game theory, is 
a zero-sum game: what winners win, losers lose. (Hirsch 1976 [1999]: 52, emphasis 
added)2 
 
Authors who understand positional goods and/or positional competition in this original 
economic sense also see them as zero-sum per definition. They endorse the Zero-Sum Claim. 
 
2 This definition shows that the textbook defence of market competition producing Pareto optimality is not 
applicable to positional competition, because in the latter kind of competition, any benefit for one person 
necessarily means an equal disadvantage for another person (Matthews 1977: 575). “What winners win, losers 
lose” (Hirsch 1976 [1999]: 52). 
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Pagano, for example (while not speaking of positional competition specifically), says the 
following about positional goods: 
 
[I]n our two-person economy, … if an individual i consumes xi, the second individual 
must consume an equal but negative quantity –xi. Thus, these types of goods are zero-
sum goods. Following Hirsch, I will call this type of good a positional good. (Pagano 
1999: 53, emphasis added) 
 
Likewise, Grolleau et al. noted about the positional race (i.e. competition) for status: 
 
Status results from one’s standing or relative position in a rank ordered reference group 
and is considered as a fixed amount resource. Therefore, status seeking is frequently 
described as a paradigmatic zero-sum game where what is gained by winners is exactly 
offset by what is lost by losers. For example, in the ‘top five percent’, it is impossible 
to fit more than five percent; similarly, two runners cannot be first at the same time. 
(Grolleau et al. 2012: 464, emphasis added) 
 
Finally, Joseph Heath (2018) also adopted the economic understanding of positional goods and 
positional competition. He characterised status as zero-sum and stated that any good consumed 
as a way of achieving status would be positional. The only way to increase the status of one 
person is by reducing the status of others, resulting in a net gain of zero. He endorsed the Zero-
Sum Claim by concluding that status competition is necessarily a zero-sum game. 
 In sum, the economic literature, where debates on positional goods and competition 
originated, focuses on fixed-sum status goods that can only be accessed by improving one’s 
relative position in the income distribution. I now move to the philosophical understanding of 
positionality (2.2.), show how it differs from the economic one and clear up some conceptual 
confusions and misunderstandings that arose when the meaning of positionality changed in the 
process (2.3.). 
 
2.2. The Philosophical Understanding 
In their 2006 paper Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift 
popularised a new definition of ‘positional good’ that differed from the economic one coined 
by Hirsch.3 According to them, “[p]ositional goods … are goods the absolute value of which, 
to their possessors, depends on those possessors’ place in the distribution of the good—on their 
relative standing with respect to the good in question” (Brighouse and Swift 2006: 474). I will 
refer to this definition as ‘the philosophical understanding’ because philosophers often use it 
in this way (see e.g. Harel Ben Shahar 2018; Fishkin 2014; Freiman 2014; Kolodny 2010). 
Freiman, for example, noted that growth in the supply of a particular positional good 
comes at the expense of others who already possess this good, whose absolute value now 
decreases accordingly (2014: 343). Harel Ben Shahar wrote that positional goods are “good for 
the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standing compared to others” 
(2018: 103). So here, positionality refers to the value that we attach to certain goods, which 
depends crucially on social and relative comparisons. Referring back to Marx’s quote, how I 
value the size of my house depends on the size of the houses in the neighbourhood. If my 
neighbours decide to build a bigger house, mine becomes relatively smaller, even if I do not 
change anything about my house at all. 
 
3 Until then, philosophers largely neglected the topic, exceptions being M. Hollis’s Education as a Positional 
Good (1982) and Positional Goods (1984) and Goodin’s Relative Needs (1990). 
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Many goods have both positional and non-positional aspects, however (Brighouse and 
Swift 2006). The value of my house not only depends on its size in comparison to the 
neighbours’ (which is positional), but it is also valuable independently of other people’s house 
sizes (its non-positional aspect). It shelters from wind and rain and provides a place where 
people can feel home, which are things that do not depend on comparisons.4 For reasons of 
accuracy, I therefore prefer to speak of ‘goods with positional value’ rather than ‘positional 
goods’. 
According to the philosophical understanding, positional competition then refers to the 
struggle between different parties5 for relative advantage.6 In the case of housing, it refers to 
the rat race between homeowners for an ever-bigger house—or at least, bigger than the 
neighbours’—and the social status this confers. 
 
2.3. Comparing the Two Understandings 
There is general agreement between the economic and philosophical understandings that 
positional competitions entail hidden costs in welfare. As Hirsch famously noted, “If everyone 
stands on tiptoe, no one sees better” (1999: 5). Everyone spends (or wastes) an increasingly 
large amount of money and other resources on flaunting positional goods, although people’s 
relative positions in the (status) hierarchy remain largely the same.  
While both meanings aim to acquire a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of the 
rat race and the waste it involves, there are obvious differences in focus between the 
philosophical and the more narrowly conceived economic understanding of positionality. In 
the economic understanding, it is one’s position in the income distribution that matters, which, 
in turn, can give you access to goods that are fixed in supply, such as a beachfront property.  
This is not necessarily the case for the philosophical understanding, in which one’s 
position in the distribution of a good is what is relevant (this can be income but extends to any 
good for which the relative position in that good’s distribution matters). The value of this good 
to its possessor changes depending upon one’s position in its distribution—that is, how many 
relevant others have goods of the same kind. How I value my beachfront house depends on 
how many of my peers have one as well and how it compares in relevant aspects (such as size). 
If more of my peers obtain (bigger) beachfront properties, then the relative value of mine 
decreases.  
In the economic understanding, however, the value of such a property to an individual 
is not a function of how much beachfront property other people have. What makes it positional 
in the economic understanding is the fact that we cannot make more of these goods, and so the 
only way to obtain them is to increase one’s relative income. This implies that the same goods 
can be positional in both understandings but for different reasons. 
The central elements of the philosophical understanding that are not part of the 
economic one are the following: (i) positionality is about one’s position in the distribution of 
the good itself (beyond income), and (ii) it is about the value of the good to its possessor, not 
about the good being fixed-sum. In the schematic overview below (Table 1), I list the main 
distinction and apply it to the beachfront property example.  
 
Table 1 
Overview of the economic and philosophical understanding of positional goods 
Economic understanding Philosophical understanding 
 
4 Cf. Goodin (1990), who makes a similar distinction, but instead of calling them ‘positional’ and ‘non-positional 
aspects’, he talks of relative and absolute needs for goods such as food, clothing and housing. 
5 By ‘parties’ I mean individuals and social groups such as teams, corporations and nations. 
6 The definition of ‘positional competition’ by Philip Brown as “how one stands relative to others within an 
implicit or explicit hierarchy” (Brown 2000: 633) misses the distinctively competitive element. 
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Positional goods are fixed-sum goods. 
Access to them depends on one’s position in 
the distribution of income. 
Positional goods are those whose value to 
their possessor depends on their position in 
the distribution of the good. 
Beachfront property is positional, because it 
is fixed-sum; one cannot make more of it. 
Access to it depends on one’s relative 
income. 
While beachfront property is fixed-sum, 
what makes it positional is that its value to its 
possessor depends on the extent to which 
others have beachfront property as well. 
 
Let us consider another example that is characteristic of the literature on positional goods. Take 
a political party whose current party leader resigns. Ana and her fellow party member, Ben, are 
both in the running for this position, which only one of them can get, per definition (i.e. the 
leadership position is fixed-sum). Let us assume that Ana is more qualified than Ben, as she 
has more relevant educational and work experience and is expected to become more popular 
amongst voters. She becomes the new party leader, gaining the status and power that go along 
with the position. 
Here, we see again a mismatch between the economic and philosophical understanding 
on positional goods. In “the case of leadership jobs” (1976 [1999]: 41–51), Hirsch called 
leadership positions ‘positional jobs’ because these are fixed-sum. The job itself, then, is a 
positional good in the economic understanding of that term. The educational credentials needed 
to obtain that job are not ‘positional goods’ in this understanding as they are not fixed-sum and 
do not strictly depend on one’s position in the income distribution.  
Hirsch linked the increase of people with educational degrees specifically to income. 
According to him, “an increase in effective demand for superior jobs can be expected to 
accompany the growth of the material sector, because with material wants better satisfied, 
people are readier to devote more resources to improving their work situation” (Hirsch 1976 
[1999]: 48). However, this has an impact on the positional economy, as an increase of resources 
(most notably, income) devoted to formal education also reduces the efficacy of a given ‘unit’ 
of education in securing access to higher-level jobs (Hirsch 1976 [1999] 48–49). Put 
differently, individuals need to spend increasing amounts of income acquiring educational 
credentials in order to improve their chances of obtaining (fixed-sum) positional goods—here, 
leadership positions. An individual’s education therefore incurs costs on society as a whole, 
since increasing amounts of money have to be spent on education for one’s relative position to 
remain the same. Positional competition then creates social waste: one’s chances of getting the 
leadership position have not altered, while expenditures have gone up. 
Philosophers took over this economic understanding of positional competition and its 
recognition of the social waste it involves. However, they broadened their understanding of 
positionality: contrary to the economic sense, they do regard educational credentials as 
positional. For the philosophical understanding, the value of the good (say, my master’s degree) 
depends on how many others have one as well. It is my position in the distribution of this good 
(beyond income) that matters, as it will determine which job opportunities are open to me. If 
Ben improved his qualities and credentials in relation to Ana’s, then hers would be devalued, 
giving her a disadvantage in the competition for the party leadership position (and the power 
and status that go along with it). 
 
Philosophers had good reasons to take over and adapt the notion of positional goods and 
positional competitions. Doing so enabled them to focus on and get a better grip on the 
important and concrete real-life struggles and competitions that people face on a daily basis in 
education, the labour market, politics and leisure. However, this conceptual shift led to theorists 
using the same notions—‘positional goods’ and ‘positional competition’—in different and 
sometimes incompatible ways. Importantly, while broadening the meaning of positional 
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competition, the philosophical understanding kept what is definitional to the economic 
understanding of positional competition—namely, its Zero-Sum Claim.7 
For example, Brighouse and Swift contended that when we consider positional goods, 
“[t]he competitive features of the goods in question give them a zero-sum aspect; the mere fact 
that some have more worsens the absolute position of those who have less” (Brighouse and 
Swift 2006: 474, emphasis added). 
Similarly, Fishkin (2014) stated that competitions in which there is a fixed number of 
places that cannot be obtained by all at the same time are entirely zero-sum. One person having 
more advantages and opportunities not only improves their standing in the order of rank but 
also reduces the advantages and opportunities available to others. “If there can only be so many 
winners, then one had better get a leg up on one’s competitors” (Fishkin 2014: 138). 
Kolodny (2010), in turn, said that “we are locked into a zero-sum Competition for 
Social Advantage, where our gain must be another’s loss and another’s gain must be our loss. 
We are thus inclined to be uncharitable, deceitful, and so on” (172). We can acquire social 
advantage by entering zero-sum competitions for social goods such as property, political 
power, social class and fame, which are also positional (171). While Kolodny explicitly 
referred to Hirsch in a footnote, it is clear that he used the notions of ‘positional goods’ and 
‘positional competition’ in line with the broader philosophical understanding. 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2018) focused on a specific form of positional competition, 
namely status competition. Status competition “is a zero-sum game: we cannot all improve our 
status relative to each other. If some gain, others lose” (Wilkinson and Pickett 2018: 149). 
These quotes suggest that authors employing the philosophical understanding think that 
positional competition is necessarily zero-sum rather than contingently so. While different 
authors use the same terms, suggesting that they are talking about the same concepts, this is 
not actually the case. As I will argue, the Zero-Sum Claim does not apply to the philosophical 
understanding of positional competition. While the debates revolving around the philosophical 
sense of positional goods/competition should continue, the Zero-Sum Claim should be dropped 
from them altogether. 
 
 
3. Problems with the Zero-Sum Claim 
 
The economic and philosophical understandings both describe (competitions for) positional 
goods as zero-sum. However, when we look at what ‘zero-sum’ means and see how demanding 
this term is, we gather that it does not apply to most of the cases the philosophical understanding 
wishes to describe and analyse. 
As noted in section 2, goods are zero-sum if their total amount is fixed (Grolleau et al. 
2014: 464). A zero-sum game, then, refers to a situation in which the payoffs add up to zero; 
what one party gains is also exactly what the other loses (Kelly 2003: 6, 77). 
However, ‘zero-sum’ does not fit with the broader philosophical understanding of 
positional competition. The key here is that it is about the good’s value to their possessors.8 As 
such, it is not purely about the fixed-sum good anymore (as was the case for the economic 
 
7 Note that philosophers broadened the economic understanding, so they haven’t completely replaced it with their 
own alternative. This means that philosophers can still make the Zero-Sum Claim, as long as they use it in the 
economic sense, referring to fixed-sum goods where access depends on relative income. However, this paper 
mostly focusses on those goods that are positional in the philosophical sense but fall outside of the scope of the 
economic understanding. 
8 Recall Brighouse and Swift’s definition: “Positional goods … are goods the absolute value of which, to their 
possessors, depends on those possessors’ place in the distribution of the good—on their relative standing with 
respect to the good in question” (2006: 474, emphasis added). 
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understanding) but about its value to individuals. While it is very useful to have this broader 
understanding of positionality, the focus on value implies that the payoffs of the sum will 
hardly ever add up to exactly zero, as the meaning of ‘zero-sum’ demands. 
One plausible way of understanding ‘value’ is in a subjective sense, where individual 
desires and attitudes are at play. However, even if measurement and interpersonal comparison 
problems could be solved, positional competition is hardly ever zero-sum in this interpretation 
of positional value (section 3.1.). ‘Value’ can also be understood in an objective sense—for 
example, when situating the value of a good in the access it offers to actual rewards and 
resources. But here too, I will argue, the outcome of the sum will hardly ever be zero (section 
3.2.). The upshot of this section is that when talking about positional value and positional 
competition in its philosophical understanding, the Zero-Sum Claim should be avoided. What 
A wins in terms of the value of positional goods will seldom or never equal what B loses in 
value. 
 
3.1. Subjective Understandings of Value 
In this first understanding, value is subjective in nature and refers to the many ways in which 
one can value or care about something, ranging from admiration to indifference to contempt. 
Valuing something involves a complex combination of deliberation, standards for perception, 
emotions, desires and behaviours that express and thereby communicate a good’s importance 
to a person (Anderson 1993: 11). 
For the Zero-Sum Claim to hold, positional competition should create gains and losses 
in subjective value for different parties that, when aggregated, amount to precisely zero. These 
wins and losses can be expressed in several ways, such as lost and added value or utility gains 
and losses. However, even if we were able to determine how the different parties value the 
good in question and (interpersonally) compare the extent to which they value the good (i.e. its 
utility), it is unlikely that the net outcome of positional competition will be exactly zero (which 
is what the Zero-Sum Claim entails). 
Take value first. A crucial question for the philosophical understanding is how much 
positional (and non-positional) value a good gains or loses to its possessor when someone else 
(also) obtains this good. This question is irrelevant for the economic understanding because it 
only focuses narrowly on the fixed-sum good at hand, such as a beachfront property: if A gets 
it (+1), this goes at the cost of B (–1), balancing each other out (0). But when we focus on 
value, which is crucial to the philosophical understanding, things become more complicated, 
and such a strictly equal outcome becomes much less likely. 
Recall Marx’s quote in the epigraph. Imagine that your neighbours want to show off 
their wealth and decide to expand their house, so that it becomes bigger than yours. It is hard 
to see why the payoffs of this positional competition amount to exactly zero, since the valuing 
preferences of you and your neighbours likely differ. Maybe your neighbour is much more 
concerned with status and showing off with his large house than you are, which means that you 
are hardly bothered by your neighbour’s quest for competitive advantage.9 Moreover, goods 
with positional value, such as houses, educational background, income and leadership 
positions, are often closely related to each other. How can we strictly separate them from each 
other and from the good’s non-positional value? And how does the value of these and other 
interconnected goods possessed by different people change over time and under changing 
circumstances? 
 
9 Note that the fact that positional arms races might elicit jealousy amongst the ‘losers’ with respect to the 
‘winners’ is not the point here. Instead, it is about how different parties value the good in question and how those 




A second way of thinking about gains and losses would be to calculate utility.10 
Economists and utilitarians have plenty of experience in measuring utility, which can also be 
applied to positional competitions. While I will not engage in existing debates11 on 
measurement problems regarding utility gains and losses (or other ways of measuring benefits 
and costs), those adhering to the philosophical understanding of positional competition must 
accept that solving such problems will not be enough. The demanding zero-sum terminology 
requires that the sum of the gains and losses of one good with positional value amounts to 
exactly zero. This implies that the winners, the losers and perhaps others have the same 
preferences to exactly the same degree. However, this is false in most cases, as I will illustrate 
using a familiar example.  
For the net outcome to be exactly zero in the case where Ana obtains the position at the 
cost of Ben, whose relative position now decreases accordingly, Ana and Ben should both 
prefer that position to exactly the same degree. But this is likely to be false in many instances—
for example, when being the leader is Ana’s only lifelong dream job, whereas Ben does not 
feel as passionate about it. As Ken Binmore noted, the intensity in preferences (or valuing 
attitudes, if you prefer to talk about ‘values’ instead of ‘preferences’ or ‘utility’) often differs 
from person to person (Binmore 2009). Winning the competition for leadership results in a 
greater utility gain for Ana than for Ben; the value of the good to the individual can vary from 
person to person. The net outcome is not zero because the good’s positional value is higher for 
one person than for the other.  
The difficulty in interpersonally comparing value or utility is worrying for those using 
the philosophical understanding of positionality and who still want to make the Zero-Sum 
Claim, as the claim substantially limits the (amount of) cases for which it holds. Even when 
focusing on how much utility the competing parties derive from only the positional value of a 
single good, the net outcome can only ever be exactly zero in an extremely limited set of cases. 
In section 4, I investigate whether this set of cases is empty or not. But first, I argue that the 
Zero-Sum Claim does not hold in the objective understanding of positional value, either. 
 
3.2. Objective Understandings of Value 
In the second understanding of (positional) value, “relativities matter not just subjectively but 
objectively” (Goodin 1990: 20). The claim that a good’s positional value ‘to their possessors’ 
decreases can also mean that the good actually becomes worth less—i.e. it becomes less useful 
or worthwhile—regardless of one’s subjective attitudes and desires. In this interpretation, 
people are arguably objectively better off with more goods with positional value and objectively 
worse off with fewer of them.12 
The goods with positional value that philosophers like to focus on, such as income and 
credentials, are often instrumental in obtaining other rewards and resources, such as food, 
clothing (Harel Ben Shahar 2018: 105–106; Goodin 1990: 22–24), social inclusion (Brighouse 
and Swift 2006: 481), social standing, self-respect (Harel Ben Shahar 2018: 107), job security, 
status and power. Since access to such rewards and resources does not depend on the subjective 
attitudes one might have towards them, this access (as provided by positional goods such as 
income and credentials) has objective value to whomever possesses it. 
On this objective understanding of value, for the Zero-Sum Claim to hold, the advantage 
of an individual A—provided that A wins the positional competition—should be equal in size 
to the corresponding disadvantage of another individual B who loses the positional competition. 
 
10 For present purposes, the exact definition of utility is irrelevant. 
11 See, for example, Barrett (2019), Binmore (2009), van der Deijl (2018), Greaves and Lederman (2018), 
Harsanyi (1995), Hausman (1995) and Moscati (2018). 
12 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to incorporate a non-subjective understanding of a good’s 
positional value.  
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In short, the net outcome of aggregating (dis)advantages should equal zero. However, this, 
again, is false in most cases. 
 Recall the example of the positional competition for the biggest house. If you are not 
concerned with the social status and prestige that a large house confers, you may decide not to 
participate in the positional rat race for ever-bigger houses. However, such valuing attitudes 
(as discussed in section 3.1.) are arguably irrelevant here. In its objective understanding, a 
good’s positional value to its possessors resides in the fact that those possessing the good (such 
as a big house and its accompanying status and prestige) affect access to important resources 
and rewards for those who have less of that good. After all, the positional rat race drives up 
housing prices in the entire neighbourhood and makes it impossible for the less well-off to buy 
a house in that area. Those who lack important resources are thereby more likely to be 
excluded; they have to move to a more affordable neighbourhood. 
 This housing example shows that even when adopting a non-subjective understanding 
of positionality, the Zero-Sum Claim does not hold. The larger the inequality in goods with 
positional value, the greater the negative impact on the worst off, as they are deprived of vital 
goods (an important one being social inclusion). Minor gains in social status and prestige for 
the better off (for example, by means of a bigger house) can have a disproportionately large 
impact on the worse off. In these cases, the gains and losses do not amount to zero. 
 Let us consider another example: Ana and Ben’s competition for party leadership. 
Again, Ben might not care about the leadership position, whereas Ana does care. But such 
subjective attitudes (as discussed in section 3.1.) are arguably irrelevant when it comes to the 
power that comes with the position, which is part of what is valuable about the job. When Ana 
wins the positional competition and becomes the leader of the party, she will objectively have 
more power (and hence Ben less power, relatively speaking), regardless of their subjective 
attitudes. Or think of the positional value of educational degrees (i.e. the opportunities they 
create on the labour market for anyone holding them). These opportunities and the access they 
provide to certain kinds of jobs are facts of the matter and do not depend on the possessors’ 
subjective attitudes. In other words, even if the holder does not care for their degree, they will 
still have more opportunities in the labour market, and conversely, people without such degrees 
will not have those opportunities.13 
The Zero-Sum Claim does not hold in this example either. To illustrate, Ana getting the 
leadership position in the political party implies that Ben does not get it—that is, her higher 
position in the political hierarchy comes at the expense of Ben not advancing. In one sense, 
Ben’s position has not changed, and he continues to do the same job as before. Yet, in another, 
relative-to-Ana-sense, Ben is now ‘lower’. However, note that the relative position change has 
not come at any material cost to Ben in this second interpretation: Ana’s gains in power and 
status are not supplied by Ben’s material resources. Therefore, it is unclear whether Ben’s 
position decreased by exactly the same amount as Ana’s increase; hence, the net outcome might 
 
13 For some goods with positional value, the size of inequality matters. Harel Ben Shahar called them cardinal 
positional goods. “The larger the inequality, the bigger the impact on the objective well-being of the worst off, 
because the size of inequality affects one’s access to” resources and rewards (2018: 105–106). For example, the 
type and size of housing one’s money can buy depends on how much others in a housing market are willing to 
spend on a similar good. For other goods, however, the size of the inequality is not relevant, but merely one’s 
position in the ranking. Harel Ben Shahar called these ordinal positional goods, for which “the harm to the worse 
off is vested entirely in the ranking. In these cases, being overtaken by someone (with regard to the amount or 
quality of the positional good) constitutes the full damage to the worst off. It does not make any further (positional) 
difference whether the other has a lot more or just slightly more” (2018: 106). For example, it does not matter 
whether Ben’s qualifications are slightly worse or a lot worse than Ana’s in the competition for the leadership 
position; the fact that Ana came first and Ben second is all there is to know in deciding which of the two gets the 
job. Either way, the outcome of the payoffs of the positional competition is unlikely to be exactly zero. 
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be higher or lower than zero. Again, the Zero-Sum Claim does not hold in an objective 
understanding of a good’s positional value to its possessor, either.  
 
 
4. The Upsides and Downsides of Abstraction 
 
As far as the philosophical understanding of positional competition is concerned, one can only 
defend the Zero-Sum Claim by holding on to an overly abstract picture of positionality. This 
picture might look as follows.  
It is not only the leadership position (or any other scarce good) that is being distributed; 
instead, it is the corresponding status (and power, for that matter) that necessarily results in a 
net outcome of zero. Even if the total amount of goods with positional value increases (e.g. 
more different leadership positions and big houses will become available), the total amount of 
status cannot increase and thus cannot be positive-sum. The total amount of status can be 
imagined as a pie. One person obtaining a positional-status good (such as a leadership position 
or a bigger house) increases the size of their slice of this fixed-sum ‘status pie’. This implies 
that an equal ‘slice’ is being taken away from someone else, which results in an outcome of 
zero. Ben not getting the leadership position implies him losing exactly the same ‘amount’ of 
status that Ana gains, with a net outcome of zero, so the argument goes. Every member of the 
political party has larger or smaller amounts of the fixed-size status pie, and by obtaining or 
not obtaining certain goods with positional value (e.g. a leadership position), the shares of 
corresponding status among the candidates change accordingly. The same goes for power: if 
someone climbs up the political ranks and thus gains power, this necessarily means that 
someone else’s power is decreased accordingly.  
This seems like an attractive way of saving the Zero-Sum Claim and making it fit with 
the philosophical understanding of positional competition. The Zero-Sum Claim then only 
seems to hold when it restricts itself to what I call ‘pure positionality’. Examples of ‘purely 
positional goods’ are status, power and prestige qua status power and prestige, detached from 
any specific good. We should eliminate most parties and only focus on the people directly 
competing with each other (Ana and Ben in our political party example, or in the case of the 
house owners, only the people from the neighbourhood). Moreover, we should assume away 
the non-positional aspects14 and merely focus on the positional ones, as both parties value the 
positional aspect in exactly the same way. Besides, we should disregard the actual impact of 
having more or less of a good with positional value on the possessor’s access to other resources 
and rewards. What we are left with is purely the status, prestige and power that the promotion 
bestows upon Ana and the person with the biggest house in comparison to their direct 
competitors. Ana obtaining a bigger piece of the ‘status pie’ implies Ben losing an equal but 
negative amount of this pie. Whatever the further consequences for others, or even for Ana and 
Ben, this very specific aspect of the competition is zero-sum. Therefore, it seems that we can 
understand positional competition if we only consider pure positionality—that is, status, power 
and prestige. 
However, a notion of a zero-sum game that only holds in cases of pure positionality 
(status, power and prestige qua status, power and prestige) is too idealised and abstract. You 
cannot possess ‘pure’ status; it seems that it is always attached to some good—that is, 
something that can be shown to others and compared with others’. You can rise in status 
because of a certain house, job or car, but you cannot have the status only. In the actual world, 
we are interested in these positional competitions because of the concrete things they are 
 
14 Some examples include the fact that Ana has an actual political and societal impact, regardless of how many 
others have impact as well, or the fact that a house is also a domicile where people can feel safe and at home. 
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attached to, such as making decisions in parliament, firing people and having people take you 
seriously. Consequently, while in the philosophical understanding, status, power and prestige 
can be conceived of as purely positional and can arguably be understood as zero-sum, it is (at 
best) difficult to tell when we have isolated these aspects and successfully abstracted away 
from non-positional aspects. In most real-life cases, positional value does not exist 
independently of the specific goods that generate and signal it. Since status, power and prestige 
are always attached to other goods, the problems raised earlier in section 3 come into force, 
leaving out many things that might matter in understanding and describing positional 
competition. As soon as we are thinking of real-life competitions instead of purely hypothetical, 
abstract ones, we can no longer speak of positional competitions as zero-sum games in any 
meaningful way. Or, at least in the context of social and political philosophy, conceptualising 
positional competition as zero-sum games removes the notion so far away from actual 
positional competitions that it becomes unhelpful and no longer insightful. Such an abstraction 
is a theoretical possibility, albeit one that no longer succeeds in adequately representing actual 
positional competitions.  
One might respond that abstractions are widely used within philosophy and for good 
reasons. Clean hypotheticals arguably help to focus on relevant aspects of the issue at hand and 
ignore irrelevant ones.15 However, I believe that such abstractions are only useful if they indeed 
(i) succeed in capturing and isolating the characteristic feature of a phenomenon and (ii) 
thereby deepen our understanding of the concrete instances they should be representing (see 
Lawson 1997: chap. 16; Weisberg 2007). The abstract notion of positional competitions as 
zero-sum games meets neither of these criteria.  
The reason that the Zero-Sum Claim fails to (ii) deepen our understanding of concrete 
positional competitions that actually impact our daily lives has to do with (i) its inability to 
capture and isolate positional competition’s characteristic feature. What authors in 
philosophical debates, such as Brighouse and Swift (2006), Kolodny (2010), Fishkin (2014), 
and Wilkinson and Pickett (2018), are actually after is describing cases where “one player can 
only be made better off by making the other player worse off” (Ross 2019). In other words, 
they are identifying cases where there is no room for Pareto improvements. However, labelling 
these cases in ‘zero-sum’ terms is often incorrect. As we have seen in section 3, a gain in 
positional value of +5 for person A implies that another person B is now worse off, although 
this loss does not have to be a loss of −5. Person A’s gain of +5 can also mean a loss of, say, 
−1 or −10 for B. The Zero-Sum Claim thus fails to capture and isolate the characteristic feature 
of positional competition that the philosophical understanding aims to analyse—namely, the 
fact that no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off. 
As the next section will show, my proposed alternative—understanding positional 
competition as a win-lose game—avoids these limitations and succeeds in accurately and 
insightfully representing a much larger set of actual positional competitions, which the 
philosophical understanding manages to include. 
 
 
5. Implications of Adopting the Win-Lose Claim 
 
In light of the above, I propose abandoning the term ‘zero-sum game’ and replacing it with 
‘win-lose game’ when speaking of positional competition in its philosophical understanding. 
In other words, we should drop the Zero-Sum Claim and replace it with the Win-Lose Claim. 
 
 The Win-Lose Claim. Positional competition is necessarily a win-lose game. 
 




As a win-lose game, positional competition means that one party’s gain still necessarily goes 
at the cost of another party, whose payoffs are now lower, while the net aggregate outcome can 
be higher or lower than zero. 
This avoids the ambiguous and inaccurate terminology that pervades discussions on 
positionality. To illustrate, consider the following quote:  
 
[P]ermitting inequalities in education or political influence or legal representation does 
not merely benefit some while leaving others as well off as they were before. The 
competitive features of [positional goods] give them a zero-sum aspect; the mere fact 
that some have more worsens the absolute position of those who have less. (Brighouse 
and Swift 2006: 482) 
 
Given how loosely the term ‘zero-sum’ is used when employing the philosophical 
understanding, it would be much clearer to adopt the accurate term ‘win-lose’ instead. While 
this allows one to recognise that someone winning necessarily goes at the cost of someone else 
losing, it also better describes what is going on in the complex relations at play in the real-life 
instances that adherents of the philosophical understanding aim to analyse. 
The conceptual shift from a zero-sum to a win-lose approach has normative 
implications as well. Whether or not the outcome of a positional competition is morally 
desirable does not depend only on one’s preferred theory of ethics or distributive justice but 
also on our understanding of positionality. To illustrate just one of those implications, take any 
positional competition for good X with positional value. Assume, for the sake of argument, that 
the better off in society win even more of good X at the cost of the already and now increasingly 
worse off.16 Let me now, by means of this example, sketch how the Win-Lose Claim generates 
different outcomes than the Zero-Sum Claim when relying on different distributive principles 
(utilitarianism, prioritarianism and the leximin version of prioritarianism) to assess the fairness 
and desirability of (the effects of) positional competitions. 
First, let us focus on utilitarianism. According to utilitarians, actions are morally right 
if and only if they maximise the good—that is, if they create an as big as possible total amount 
of good. It takes each person’s interest as having equal moral weight: benefits to one party 
matter just as much as similar benefits to another party (Sinnott-Armstrong 2019). When we 
understand positional competitions as zero-sum games, then utilitarians would be indifferent 
towards them by definition, as the benefits to the winners and the costs to the losers would 
always balance each other out, with a net outcome of exactly zero. The only aspect that matters 
for utilitarianism (i.e. the overall utility) would not increase or decrease but remain exactly the 
same.  
Utilitarians could, of course, object to positional competitions that generate perverse 
incentives and social waste. However, to do so, they should adopt a broad perspective and the 
Win-Lose Claim instead of the Zero-Sum Claim. The former holds on to what characterises 
positional competition—winners’ gains necessarily come at the cost of losers’ losses—but still 
allows for the possibility that the overall outcome (all things taken into account) is negative 
due to, for example, the social waste involved. The Win-Lose Claim also allows for the 
conceptual possibility that a given positional competition is desirable overall—namely, when 
 
16 While I merely assume for the sake of argument that the already better off continue to win positional 
competitions, there are numerous real-life examples in which this actually happens. Think of parents with a 
relatively high position on the socio-economic ladder who pass on advantages to their children, which, in turn, 
increases their chances of ending up relatively high on the ladder as well. Or think of competitions for status. 
Those are easier to win if one already has a sought-after, high-paying job. 
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the benefits (to the better off, in our example) are bigger than the losses (to the worse off, in 
our example). 
Second, take prioritarianism, according to which “for any person, the lower her lifetime 
well-being score … the more morally valuable it would be to secure an incremental gain of 
well-being for her (or to avoid a small loss)” (Arneson 2013). In determining the overall 
desirability, prioritarians give extra moral weight (to well-being gains that go) to the worse off. 
In their 2006 paper, Brighouse and Swift made a prioritarian case for an equal 
distribution of goods with positional value, even if that would entail levelling down (i.e. taking 
positional goods from the better off or best off without redistributing those goods to the worse 
off or worst off): 
 
[L]eveling down with respect to positional goods benefits absolutely, in some respect, 
those who would otherwise have less than others. It may thus be amenable to 
justification by appeal to prioritarian … considerations. Where positional goods (or, to 
speak more precisely, goods with positional aspects) are concerned, one does not need 
to be an egalitarian to have reason to level down. (Brighouse and Swift 2006: 472) 
 
If one interprets positional competition as a zero-sum game, it indeed makes sense to level 
down on prioritarian grounds. Assume that a person already better off wins a positional 
competition (gaining +5 in well-being), which means that a worse off person is now even worse 
off (losing −5 in well-being). When priority is given to these ‘losers’, their losses always 
morally outweigh the gains to the winners, which implies that any positional competition is 
inevitably morally problematic (i.e. regardless of how much more moral weight you give to the 
worse off). 
 Dropping the Zero-Sum Claim in favour of the Win-Lose Claim makes this story more 
nuanced because it all turns on how much moral weight we give to the gains and losses of the 
different parties in the distribution of good X. Imagine that a better-off person wins (more of) 
good X, gaining, say, +5 (in well-being) at the cost of a worse off person, who loses −1, or 
−10 for that matter. Whether positional competition for good X is morally desirable or 
problematic now hinges on how those benefits and losses compare to each other and how much 
more moral weight is given to the losses of the worse off. Assume a prioritarian gives double 
the moral weight to the worse off: while they would oppose any positional competition on the 
basis of the Zero-Sum Claim, they would not oppose a positional competition that generates 
+5 (in well-being) for the better off and −1 for the worse off.17 
 Third, consider the leximin version of prioritarianism, which gives absolute priority to 
the worst off in society, then to the position just above the worst off and so on (Fleurbaey 
2021).18 If one takes the leximin criterion as the guiding principle of justice, then any positional 
competition that generates further costs to the already worst off will be impermissible, 
regardless of how those costs compare to the benefits of others. In our case, where the already 
well off are expected to win the positional competition, any gain going to them inevitably 
implies a loss for the worst off. Regardless of how small this loss is, it is not morally justified 
 
17 In real-life cases, this is further complicated by the fact that many goods have both positional and non-positional 
value so that the positive impact of the good’s non-positional value on the worse off can outweigh the costs of a 
positional rat race. Take education. Apart from the competitive advantage a degree generates, individuals also 
enjoy non-positional benefits that come along with being an educated person, such as knowledge and skills that 
are enjoyed for their own sake. In addition, positional competitions for highly complex jobs, such as surgeons, 
might generate positive externalities, as it enables others to enjoy better health care as well. Of course, it all 
depends on concrete circumstances which benefits and costs (or gains and losses) any given positional competition 
generates for its winners, its losers and society at large. 
18 The worst off are defined as “those with the least share of the primary goods of income and wealth, and powers 
and positions of office” (Freeman 2019), pre-eminently goods with positional value. 
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on leximin grounds. To make this claim, which is the core of the leximin principle, leximin 
theorists need only the Win-Lose Claim and not the more stringent Zero-Sum Claim. The Win-
Lose Claim then enables them to object to any kind of positional competition instead of having 
to restrict themselves to rare cases in which losses and gains are exactly equal in size. 
While this brief discussion of positional competition through the utilitarian, prioritarian 
and leximin lenses only scratches the surface, it suffices to show the (politically) philosophical 
relevance and implications of replacing the Zero-Sum Claim with the Win-Lose Claim. 
Importantly, the Win-Lose Claim provides conceptual room for more interesting and nuanced 
discussions about the desirability and (in)justice involved in the positional competitions that 





Different authors in the literature on positional competition have made the Zero-Sum Claim. 
However, the terms ‘positional goods’ and ‘positional competitions’ are often used 
ambiguously, creating conceptual confusion between what I have called the ‘economic’ and 
the ‘philosophical’ understanding of positionality.  
The original economic understanding of positionality correctly calls positional goods 
‘zero-sum goods’ because they are fixed in supply. Access to such goods is determined by 
one’s position in the distribution of income. One person’s rise in this distribution (of, say, +1) 
produces the externality of another person going down by the same amount (–1), resulting in 
an outcome of exactly zero. 
However, the philosophical understanding in the debate shifted the focus to the value 
of a good to the individual, which changes depending on one’s position in the distribution of 
that good. These two understandings of positionality are obviously not the same. While there 
were good reasons for this shift in understanding, it should have implied dropping the Zero-
Sum Claim, which is still made in the philosophical literature but no longer holds. 
Replacing the Zero-Sum Claim with my Win-Lose Claim provides a more accurate 
picture of what positional competition, in its philosophical understanding, actually is and why 
it is worrying: one person winning necessarily entails another person losing, making Pareto 
improvements impossible. My approach thus clears up conceptual confusion and more 
accurately captures the real-life positional competitions that philosophers aim to analyse. In 
addition, it has the potential to inform and shed new light on debates about the desirability of 
(actual) positional competitions. All in all, I am convinced that replacing the term ‘zero-sum’ 
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